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Abstract. This survey paper discusses the policy implications that can be expected from
the recent research on nonlinearity and chaos in economic models. Expected policy
implications areinterpreted as a driving force behind the recent proliferation of research in
this area. In general, it appears that no new justification for policy intervention is
developed in models of endogenous fluctuations, although this conclusion depends in part
on the definition of equilibrium. When justified, however, policy tends to be very effective
in these models.
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A substantial amount of recent research has sought to elucidate the role of
nonlinearity and chaos in macroeconomic models. Some of the work has been theoretical,
attempting to ascertain whethersimple nonlinear deterministic models can exhibit the kind
of fluctuations typically found in economic data. Other work has been empirical, and
discusses the possibility that actual economic time series are characterized by chaotic
dynamics.l Both lines of research are regarded as being in the early stages. According to
Scheinkman (1990, p. 46), “... none of these developments is far enough along to bring
about a change in the way economic practitioners proceed.” This point is generally
conceded. Nevertheless, the fact that so much research is being done suggests that some
economists expect new and important policy implications from these models.2 This paper
surveys the recent research and attempts to present a picture of these potential policy
implications. In doing so, focus is placed first on whether stabilization policy is in itself
desirable in recent examples of nonlinear models, secondly on the efficacy of policy in these
examples in the cases where intervention is justified, and thirdly on the types of policy
errors that can occur if policy advice is based on linear models when the economy is
actually characterized by significant nonlinearities.
Recognizing that theorists are often critical of pragmatists, and vice—versa, the
point of view taken in this paper is that the researchers working on nonlinear
methodologies are offering a critique ofpresent daylinear methodologies, that is, the linear
stochastic difference equation approach popular in macroeconomics since the inid—1950s.
Such a critique is only important to the extent that linearmodels are fundamentally wrong
tSee Grandmont (1987a) for some of the theoretical work, and LeBaron (1991) for a survey of
the empirical work. For an introduction to the subject, see Baumol and Behabib (1989), Boidrin and
Woodford (1990), Brock (1990), Butler (1990), Kelsey (1988), or Scheinkman (1990).
2Woodford (1990, pp. 24—25) suggests that “... the fact that [nonlinear] models could well have
consequences for policy analysis that are different from those associated with more conventional models
an important reason for being interested in the question of [these] models’ logical coherence . ...
1or misleading, skewing our understanding of the economy and perhaps corrupting the
associated policy advice. It is possible to hold belief in a “wrong” theory that generates
“incorrect” policy advice, in the sense that if the advice is executed, the actual net effects
will be fundamentally different from those predicted by the theory. This survey attempts
to illuminate the extent to which the workin nonlinear economic dynamics has generated a
successful critique.3
Several broad conclusions are espoused. Based on the survey presented here, it is
not clear that nonlinear models inducing endogenous fluctuations provide, per Se, a
satisfying new justification for stabilization policy, that is, government intervention to
eliminate or mitigate the fluctuations. Of paramount importance is that, under the
equilibrium modeling strategy typically followed in this literature, the endogenous
fluctuations generated tend to be Pareto optimal. Models of this type that do generate a
role for policy rely not on nonlinearities, but on some other assumption such as incomplete
markets, deviations from rational expectations, or important externalities. While such
justifications of policy may be quite reasonable, they are not innovative. However, such a
conclusion depends in part on how equilibrium is defined in these models, and this point is
emphasized throughout the discussion.
The above conclusion is tempered somewhat by a concern about the treatment of
expectations in these models. When equilibrium paths characterized by perfect foresight
become extremely complicated, the perfect foresight assumption itself becomes less tenable.
Maintaining the perfect foresight assumption can imply that the agents in the model never
3Most present day policy advice is linked to linear theories, and while few would claim this
approach is exactly correct, many believe that linear specifications provide an approximation to the true
law of motion for the macroeconomy. Both measurement and misspecification introduce errors into these
equations. This paper is not concerned, then, with arguing that the linear frameworks in use today are
theoretically inaccurate; the fact that these models are merely approximations is well accepted. Instead,
an attempt is made to illustrate fundamenial ways in which the nonlinear approach yields alternative
policy advice.
2make a forecasting mistake even though an observer of the economy might conclude that
the state vector follows a white noise process. This seems to imply that alternative
expectational assumptions will play an important role in future research on these models.
When stabilization is justified, simple and effective policy rules often exist in the
nonlinear framework which can achieve the desired objective, in contrast to some linear
stochastic models where the efficacy of policy is in question. The mathematics that
produce the cyclical and chaotic dynamics, the hallmark of this literature, are based on
variations in parameters which lead to changes in the dynamic properties of the model.
When some of the parameters of the model can be set by the policy authorities, the
authorities have considerable control over the dynamic outcome.
Finally, and not surprisingly, it appears that fundamentally mistaken policy
inferences can be made when linear frameworks are used to approximate nonlinear
relationships. This idea is illustrated via an extended example (with optimizing agents and
rational expectations) where answers to policy questions change dramatically as certain
assumptions concerninglinearity are relaxed.
The remainder of the paper includes a discussion of the impact of nonlinear
modeling strategies on economic theory, followed by a consideration of policy advice in
models characterized by nonlinear dynamics. The section on policy includes a brief look at
prominent examples in the literature. Sections five and six briefly discuss stochastic
considerations and assess the empirical implications and evidence, respectively, and the
final section provides summary comments. The upcoming section consists ofmathematical
preliminaries. It develops a simple description of theoperational differences between linear
and nonlinear models and provides some definitions that serve as a basis for the subsequent
discussion.
3II. PRELIMINARIES: LINEAR AND NONLINEAR DYNAMIC MODELS
Consider a discrete time dynamic model given by
(1) = G(Z~1)~
where z~ is a pxl vector of state variables, a [0,1] parameterizes a family of
differentiable maps G(.), and G(0) = 0 for every a, that is, the null vector is a fixed
point of Ga(• ).4 The current state vector is given by G~(z0),where G2 represents
t iterations of G(.), and is the initial state vector. The map G(.) displays
continuous dependence on the parameter a. If the initial vector z0 is not the null vector,
or if the system is perturbed slightly from the steady state, the system described by
equation (1) may or may not evolve in such a way that the steady state is asymptotically
attained. Ifit does, the steady stateis said to be stable; otherwise it is unstable.S
Suppose first that Ga(•) is linear. Then (1) can be written as z~ = Az~1where
A is a fixed non—null pxp matrix which depends continuously on the parameter a.
Analysis of stability properties involves computing eigenvalue conditions for the A
matrix, and the intuition is not difficult. Suppose the system is univariate, A is a real
number, and z0 # 0. Then I A I > 1 implies an ever—diverging z2, while I A < 1
implies that thesteady state is stable. If A = ~1, a special case is obtained; in particular,
the system remains in a two period cycle if A = —1, and it remains at = if A = 1.
Analogously, for the vector system with no zero elements in z0, the stability condition is
that all the eigenvalues of A are inside the unit circle in the complex plane.
4For an exposition of the material in the remainder of this section, see Grandmont (1988) or
Wiggins (1990). While the distinction between differential and difference equations can be important in
this field, many economic theories attempt to explain dynamic relationships in a discrete time format.
Stochastic considerations are also important but will be deferred until section five.
51n economics, a distinction is often drawn between historical variables, such as the capital stock,
initial values of which might be thought of as being determined by history, and future—oriented
variables, such as prices, initial values of which might be deduced by forward—looking agents who
understand the model in which they operate. The discussion here relate8 best to the historical variables
interpretation, as the initial vector is taken as given.
4Economists often simply impose stability conditions in linear dynamic models. This
is because, in linear models, dynamic paths other than those converging to a steady state
often do not make economic sense.8 Cycles are a special case of parameter values, and
explosive dynamics are rarely observed in economic time series. Therefore, when working
with linear models, it is natural for economists to equate the notion of economic
equilibrium with the mathematical concept ofthe steady state.
When G(.) is nonlinear, one simple way to analyze stability is to linearize the
system at thesteady state by evaluating the Jacobian matrix DC at the null vector. This
approximation will be valid for a sufficiently small neighborhood of the fixed point. The
condition for (now local) stability is that the eigenvalues of DG(0) lie inside the unit
circle. Most of the new and controversial analysis of nonlinear economic dynamics focuses
on models where this condition is not met, that is, where the system does not tend toward
a steady state. With linear dynamic models, this case was essentially uninteresting because
it implied either very special parameter values in order to get cyclic outcomes, or explosive
dynamics. In a nonlinear system, by contrast, cycles are possible for a wide range of
parameter values, and, perhaps more importantly, even more complicated dynamic paths
are possible for still other ranges of parameter values.7 The main benefit of nonlinear
dynamic modeling is that it is possible to consider reasonable and simple economic models
that never converge to a steady state; even deterministic versions can display endogenous
fluctuations.
By using an appropriate parameter index, one can consider how the dynamics of the
6For instance, a linear model with dynamics diverging from the steady state might imply
negative prices at some time 1 1.
7it is important to stress that nonlinearity alone is insufficient for the map to display these
dynamic properties—certain conditions must be met. This is easiest to see in the univariate case, where
a graph of z~ ~ = G(zt) in (zt + 1,zt) space demonstrates that the map must be nonmonotonic before
one can observe dynamics qualitatively different from those associated with linear maps. See Grandmont
(1988).
5system change as the condition for the stability of the steady state is approached and
violated. Typically, a is chosen so that greater values imply that the eigenvalue
condition for the local stability of the steady state no longer holds and hence more
complicated trajectories become stable. Suppose that when a is near zero, Gt(z0) tends
toward the steady state for z0 near the null vector, and that linearization at the steady
state reveals this fact. Now imagine examining the stability condition with successively
larger values ofthe a parameter. At some value for a, say a0, the stability condition
for the steady state no longer holds. This is known as a bifurcation point.
There are three ways that the condition can be violated; one ofthe eigenvalues must
be either greater than 1, less than negative one, or else a pair of complex conjugate roots
must lie outside the unit circlein the complex plane. Each ofthese cases is associated with
a different type of bifurcation, known as fold, flip, and Hopf bifurcations respectively.
However, even though a > a0 and the steady state is unstable, the system need not
explode. Instead, the nonlinearity of G(.) can contain the dynamics to some
neighborhood of the steady state. For instance, the observed time series from such a
system can be periodic.
One might imagine further increases in the bifurcation parameter a leading
eventually to a violation of the stability condition for the cycle, but where the dynamics of
the system are again contained by the nonlinearity of G0(.). The observed dynamic path
in such a case might be more complicated still. One relatively well—known example is the
Feigenbaum cascade, a period-doubling bifurcation process where the system at first
converges to the steady state, and then to cycles ofperiod 2, 4, 8, ..., for successively higher
values ofthe bifurcation parameter. At still higher values ofthe bifurcation parameter, the
character of the observed time series undergoes a qualitative change: it becomes
completely aperiodic. This is known as a chaotic trajectory, although aperiodicity alone is
6insufficient to define chaos.8
-
The set of points on the dynamic path as time tends to infinity is known as the
attractor of the system; this is simply a way to describe limiting behavior. An attractor
might simply consist of k points, where k is finite. In particular, k might be unity. In
this case, according to the local analysis described above, arbitrary initial conditions near
the steady state converge to the steady state; hence, the “attractor” is a single point. But
theattractor might instead consist ofan infinity of points and may have special topological
properties. In particular, simple attractors are topological manifolds, and strange
attractors are fractals. Simple attractors are associated with relatively simple dynamics,
and strange attractors are associated with chaos. Conceptualizing long—run equilibria as
attractors offers an intuitive way to understand the heart of models using nonlinear
dynamics.
In summary, the possible asymptotic outcomes in nonlinear models are roughly
characterized steady states, cycles, and chaos. For some sets of parameter values, a steady
state may be the stable outcome, while for other sets, the stable outcome may be a cycle,
and the cycle may be of arbitrary length. A qualitatively different third possibility,
deterministic chaos, may exist for a third set of parameter values. Relative to linear
models, nonlinear approaches exhibit a rich set of possible observed outcomes. In the next
sections an assessment of these facts will be made as they apply to policy considerations.
8A rigorous definition of chaos is beyond the scope of this paper; see Wiggins (1990). For the
purposes of this survey, it is sufficient to note that chaotic sequences are aperiodic and may be
indistinguishable from white noise (Brock and Malliaris, 1989). In addition, chaotic sequences are
sensitive to initial conditions, in the sense that for initial conditions very close in the domain, the implied
dynamics diverge and quickly become dissimilar. This is widely interpreted as implying that chaotic
systems are difficult or even impossible to predict, since errors in measuring the initial state eventually
imply a completely different time sequence.
7ifi. THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NONLINEAR MODELS
In actual economic data, cyclical and noisy sequences are often observed. Nonlinear
dynamic models therefore offer the possibility of explaining economic phenomena in a~
purely endogenous manner, without resorting to ad hoc stochastic specifications. Such a
development is important for economic theory and seems quite promising. Furthermore,
the mathematical assumptions needed to obtain cycles and chaos do not translate in any
obvious way to special economic assumptions—there is nothing in the mathematics that is
inherently contradictory with economic theory. Thus, while these outcomes of nonlinear
models are not equilibria in the mathematical sense of the word (i.e., the variable is never
at rest), from an economic perspective, all equilibrium conditions may be met.
Terminology, then, presents a problem. The concept of equilibrium is used both to
mean a steady state and to mean that a set of conditions imposed by economists are
satisfied. Therefore, the definition of equilibrium becomes particularly important when
discussing the behavior induced by nonlinear systems. For the purposes of the remainder
of this paper, the term equilibrium will be used in the economic context, and the generic
mathematical concepts of steady states, cycles, and chaos will be used to describe dynamic
behavior. Thus, logical discussion of “chaotic equilibrium” or “periodic equilibrium” is
possible, meaning that economic equilibrium conditions such as market clearing are met,
but that the limiting dynamic behavior of the system is chaotic or periodic. Similarly,
reference can be made to steady states and cycles generically, without reference to aspects
like market clearing, or to economic equilibrium without reference to its dynamic
properties. In short, the terminology draws a distinction between economic equilibrium
and the dynamic properties ofan equilibrium sequence, because in nonlinear models it is no
longer sensible to presume economic equilibrium is described by a steady state.
Of the non—steady state outcomes in these models, the possibility of chaotic
trajectories are generally considered much more interesting. In particular, for business
8cycle modeling, one of the criticisms of the early post—war research in nonlinear dynamics
was that actual business cycles are not exactly repetitive as the deterministic model would
imply. (Of course, one could always add noise, interpreted as measurement error, to these
models; see section five.) However, the discovery that complicated, random—looking
sequences might prevail in deterministic models has dampened that criticism substantially.
Therefore, it is really the possibility of chaos that has revived interest in nonlinear dynamic
models.
Because these models require certain conditions in order to produce chaos, it is
important that examples be developed of standard optimizing models with plausible
parameter values that generate chaotic sequences from a large set ofinitial conditions. The
assumptions should be standard, so that the emergence of chaotic equilibrium paths cannot
be attributed to unusual features of the model. The parameter values must be plausible,
and not simply possible, because otherwise chaos can be dismissed as empirically unlikely.
While many authors have attempted such a feat, they have so far fallen short of a
completely convincing demonstration.
It should be emphasized, however, that much of the problem in writing down
coherent examples may stem from the relatively rudimentary mathematical techniques
available to study chaotic systems. The phenomenon is simply not yet well understood.
Economists attemptingto apply the mathematics have been forced to mold simple dynamic
economic models into a framework for studying chaos that is relatively well known, such as
the period-doubling bifurcation process mentioned earlier. The research on chaos in
economic models is therefore at best suggestive and at worst uninformative about the
likelihood that chaos is a relevant possibility in more realistic dynamic economic models
where the mathematics to study the system have not beenfully worked out.
For researchers who equate economic equilibrium with dynamic steady states,
nonlinear systems provide a rigorous way to think about disequilibrium modeling, as
9deviations from steady states can arise endogenously and persist indefinitely. The
discussion in this section has highlighted, however, how this conceptualization can be
misleading. There is no sense in which non-steady state outcomes of nonlinear models are
necessarily associated with “disequilibrium” in the economic sense. It may well be that a
nonlinear model which never converges to a steady state nevertheless has equilibrium paths
characterized by perfect competition, perfect foresight, and continuous market clearing.
The fact that most examples of cycles and chaos in well-specified models are developed in
exactly this type offramework drives most of the conclusions about policy surveyed in the
next section.
IV. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF NONLINEAR METHODOLOGY
There is no clear agreement in the economics profession concerning the policy
interpretation of nonlinear methodologies. For instance, Brock and Malliaris (1989, pp.
305—6) have stated that the policy implications of deterministic models with endogenous
fluctuations are obvious, because these theories typically suggest “... strong government
stabilization policies,” in contrast to theories where fluctuations are caused by exogenous
shocks, where stabilization is, “... at best, an exercise in futility ....“ However, the
following review of three prominent examples of endogenous fluctuations does not suggest
such a blanket conclusion.
In particular, it appears to be difficult to obtain a newjustification for stabilization
policy in these models, that is, a justification for removing or mitigating the fluctuations
that does not rely on weakening some aspect of either perfect foresight, perfect
competition, or continuous market clearing. The cyclic and chaotic equilibria that are
generated in these examples tend to be Pareto optimal outcomes unless one or more of
these assumptions is abandoned. Thus while the efficacy of policy actions may be greater
in these models, in the sense that the authorities may have great ability to influence the
10dynamics of the economy relative to some other models where they are essentially
impotent, the desirability ofinterventionist policy remains in doubt.
Justifying Policy in Nonlinear Models
The three examples reviewed in this section involve two frameworks, or versions of
them, that are commonly employed in theoretical discussions. The first is the Ramsey
problem of optimal growth and the other is the overlapping generations model. The third
example is a variation on the first.9
A sketch of a one—sector optimal growth model consists of a representative
consumer who maximizes discounted utility over an infinite horizon; typically ~0fi1U(c1),
where U(.) is a utility function with standard properties, c1 is consumption, and fi E
(0,1) is the discount factor. A single good is produced using both labor, L~, and capital,
k1. The good can either be consumed or used as an input into production, given by
F~e1,k2). Capital depreciates at a constant rate 6 (0,1).
An important result in the literature on nonlinear economic dynamics, developed in
detail by Dechert (1984), is that in this baseline one—sector model the optimal capital
accumulation path is described by kH.l = 11(k1), where H(.) is monotomcally increasing
and independent of 13, provided the utility function is concave, and regardless of whether
or not the production function is concave. Cycles and chaos are ruled out in this case.
This result does not hold for a two—sector optimal growth model, however.
The two—sector model also has a representative consumer maximizing utility over
an infinite horizon, say ~0fl1U(c1), except that there are now two goods, a consumption
good and a capital good, each of which is produced using capital and labor as inputs. The
production functions are given by ~ and F2( ~,k~) for the consumption and
9There are many other examples, but they are not all in optimizing frameworks, and Boldrin and
Woodford (1990) have suggested that they can be inconsistent with utility maximization.
11capital good, respectively, and the constraints are c~ F1(t~,k~), k1~1 ~ F2(L~,k~), £~ +
L (the labor endowment), and k~ + k~ k1, with k0 given. Boldrin and Montrucchio
(1986) proved that for this case, and in fact for the n-sector case, the optimal capital
accumulation path could be chaotic. Specifically, they show how to construct an economy
with any given dynamics obeying the assumptions of the model, including the choice of a
discount parameter. For some of the original examples of chaos in this framework, the
necessary values of the discount parameters were implausibly low; in fact, they were near
zero.’°
Boldrin and Montrucchio (1986) derive their results in an optimizing framework
with perfect competition and perfect foresight, and the cycles and chaos they produce are
equilibrium outcomes, in the economic sense defined above. The complicated capital
accumulation paths that result are Pareto optimal—no alternative path exists that makes
someone in the economy better off without making someone else worse off. Under the
assumptions laid out, there is no role for stabilization policy, as government intervention
cannot lead to a Pareto superioroutcome.
The laissez faire policy advice implied is hard to reconcile with the concept of
equilibrium as a steady state. However, by restricting the notion of equilibrium to mean
only continuous market clearing under perfect foresight, the Pareto optimality of a
complicated dynamic path becomes feasible. Grandmont (1985) noted the Pareto
optimality ofthe cydes and chaos generated in a standard overlapping generations model
and suggested reasons why government intervention might nevertheless be justified.
Grandmont’s (1985) example serves both as an illustration ofhow another of the commonly
used dynamic models in economics can generate chaotic time paths and how stabilization
t0Boldrin and Montrucchio (1986) calculate a two—sector example with fi = .01072 . However,
in more recent research, Boldrin and Montrucchio (1992) show that any dynamic path can be justified as
optimal by the choice of the utility function and the technology, even if given an arbitrary value for the
discount parameter. See also the discussion in Boldrin and Woodford (1990).
12policy might be considered appropriate. -
The overlapping generations model consists of agents that live for two periods and
maximize time separable utility U1(c1) + U2(c2) where c~,‘r = 1, 2, is consumption in
the first and second period of an agent’s life. There is a single perishable good and a single
asset, a fixed stock of money M. Endowments are given by vi 0, r = 1, 2. The
optimum consumption choicefor the consumer depends only on the ratio of current priceto
expected price, ~1/~÷1 0~. The dynamics of the model can be analyzed via a one
dimensional difference equation 0~ = G(~f+1~ where time is reversed.
Grandmont (1985) derives conditions on the function G(.) necessary for a
period-doubling bifurcation process, the same process described in section two, to occur.
The condition is that, roughly, the degree of risk aversion ofthe old agents must be “large”
relative to that of the young agents. If the condition is met, cycles and chaos exist as
perfect foresight equilibrium outcomes. As stressed by Boldrin and Woodford (1990),
Grandmont’s (1985) framework produces many potential equilibrium outcomes, among
which a steady state is one possibility. Without placing more restrictions on the model, no
prediction can be made about which among these many equilibria will be realized; in this
sense the modelis indeterminate. The complicated trajectories generatedin this model are,
in a sense, of a qualitatively different type than those generated in the optimal growth
framework.
The price paths generated, whether constant, cyclical, or chaotic, are once again
Pareto optimal outcomes. However, Grandmont (1985) asserts that while complicated
dynamics and perfect foresight are compatiblemathematically, they may not be compatible
economically. That is, if the economic variables of interest to agents are following chaotic
trajectories, and therefore appear to be evolving as white noise from the point of view of
the outside observer, how much sense does it make to continue to endow the agents in the
model with perfect foresight? That kind of accuracy would be, at best, uncanny, and
13Grandmont (1985) proceeds with policy analysis by assuming the economy is initially away
from theequilibrium path. Grandmont (1985, p. 1034) explains,
Periodic equilibria with perfect foresight are Pareto optimal, so it
would seem that there is nothing to do about them .... [ButJ the argument is
misleading. Perfect foresight is very unlikely to obtain out of long run (here
periodic) equilibr[ium]. This is especially true ... when there are many
cyclical equilibria. Traders will therefore “learn” ... until the ... environment
becomes repetitive enough.”
Grandmont’s (1985) point about the incompatibility of perfect foresight and chaos
should perhaps be emphasized. When economic equilibrium is equated with the concept of
a steady state, it may be quite reasonable to presume that agents learn to avoid
expectational errors and thus assess their future economic circumstances accurately.
However, when the concept of economic equilibrium is viewed as compatible with any
attractor, including those that describe chaotic trajectories, the wisdom of assuming
expectational errors will naturally be eliminated is called into question.’2 The idea receives
some support from Sargent (1987a), who notes that a central tenet ofrational expectations
is that agents in the model can predict as well as the economist manipulating the model.
In Grandmont’s economy, however, agents have perfect foresight even along a chaotic
trajectory. Thus, even though the dynamics appear to be random to the observer, agents
in the model never make aforecasting mistake.
If this rationale for government intervention in themodel economy is accepted, it is
not difficult to show that the government can indeed effectively intervene. Grandmont
(1987b) examines a version of the model with a government sector that has three
traditional instruments at its disposal, interpreted as forms of budgetary, fiscal, and
ttltalics in original.
‘2The “learning” implied refers to alternative models of expectations formation. Agents might be
viewed as updating their beliefs by assessing past data on the variables they wish to forecast, perhaps
using standard statistical techniques. See Bullard (1992) for an introduction. Analyzing the effects of
introducing learning would lead us too far astray—the point for the purposes of this paper is simply
that the treatment of expectations is a concern for these models.
14monetary policy. It is shown that simple policy rules exist that can, if they are credible,
force the economy onto an arbitrary perfect foresight equilibrium path. According to
Grandmont (1987b), then, the government has at its disposal the necessary tools to
stabilize the economy, in the sense ofmoving to the steady state path, should it so desire.
In this model the efficacy of policy is clear. On the other hand, this discussion of
countercycical policy relies on the economic incompatibility of complicated dynamics and
perfect foresight—the “learning” implied is neither commonly modeled nor well understood
in economics.
In fact, deviations from the baseline assumptions of perfect foresight, perfect
competition, and continuous market clearing, perhaps quite reasonable and very slight,
tend to lead to new classes of models where laissez faire policy advice is suboptimal. On
this basis, one might be led to question the robustness of the results on the optimality of
deterministic cycles reviewed so far. For instance, a version of the one—sector optimal
growth model analyzed earlier in this section can produce endogenous cydes when a loan
market is missing. In particular, Woodford (1989) demonstrates how a model with two
types of infinitely—lived agents, one with only a capital endowment and the other endowed
solely with labor, can generate complicated dynamics when the capital owners (firms) can
only finance investment projects out of internal funds.’3 By assunung that the
entrepreneurs maximize a (special) utility function given by ~0fl1log C1, Woodford
(1989) deduces that the dynamics of the economy can be described by a first order
nonlinear difference equation. The existence of chaotic time paths, at some parameter
values (but regardless ofthe discount rate /3),is proven using standard techniques.
The policy implications in Woodford’s (1989) model are unambiguously
interventionist. Because the framework is that of one—sector optimal growth, the
t3See also the related model of Becker and Foias (1992).
15endogenous fluctuations are Pareto inferior in this model: the previously cited research of
Dechert (1984) indicates that the Pareto optimal outcome for the same one—sector
technology is a steady state. Therefore, the complicated dynamics should be eliminated if
possible. Furthermore, the steady state of the model is not the Pareto optimal steady
state. Woodford (1989, p. 331) concludes that “... achiev[ing] an efficient use of resources
would involve continuing intervention, even in the steady state.”
The activist advice enters into this model from the incomplete markets assumption,
and the incompleteness takes a specific form. Such an approach may or may not be
reasonable; there may be empirical methods available to test the assumption. However, it
remains that there is no published example of a well—specified, optimizing model, obeying
baseline assumptions, where Pareto inferior endogenous fluctuations exist. The reason for
this seems clear—one must allow for some type of market incompleteness to justify
government intervention under a criterion ofPareto optimality. In the examples developed
so far, simply being more explicit about dynamics and conceptualizing long—run equilibria
as attractors has been insufficient to break the fundamental welfare results. Unless one is
willing to accept variations on the baseline assumptions, which may of course be quite
reasonable, the preliminary conclusion seems to be that when endogenous fluctuations exist
in optimizing models, the associated policy advice is laissez—faire. Subject to the caveats
mentioned earlier about the mathematics, and except to the extent that complicated
attractors may be incompatible with the assumption of perfect foresight, the generationof
endogenous cycles through nonlinear modeling does not appear to provide any new
ammunition for the debate between those who believe in activist policy and those who do
not. This is not to say that laissez faire is the best policy; it is merely to say that the
debate on that topic so far has not been altered by contributions from the literature on
endogenous fluctuations.
As for the efficacy of policy in nonlinear models, the effects of employing nonlinear
16methodologies seem clear. As has been noted, these models are based on bifurcation
theory, which involves the analysis of indexed families of maps. Generally speaking, the
long—run outcomes of such systems, that is, the nature of their attracting sets, display
continuous dependence on parameters. In practice, equilibrium maximizing models contain
a handful of parameters, some of which may represent policy rules such as the rate of
taxation or the rate of money growth. In the vernacular of section two, the bifurcation
parameter in a particular application might be taken to be one of the policy parameters,
and the long—run outcomes of the system will then display continuous dependence on the
policy rule. Often, therefore, one will conclude from these models that the authorities have
considerable control over the asymptotic outcomes ofthe system, and thus that the efficacy
ofpolicy isgreat.
Misleading Policy Inference from Linear Models
Policy conclusions, including conclusions about the efficacy ofpolicy, can change as
assumptions about linearity are relaxed. Thus, even if nonlinear dynamic models offer no
new justification for policy, it still remains that linear models may be misleading in a
fundamental way, skewing our understanding of the economy and corrupting the associated
policy advice, as alluded to in the introduction. This section emphasizes how such a
corruption can occur by consideration of a specific economic environment and a specific
policy question. There is no pedagogically clear, noncontroversial example to use, and
there currently exist only a few economic models with sufficient nonlinearity to generate
cycles and chaos. Nevertheless the following history of the Cagan theory of hyperinflation
wi]l serve to illustrate the key points.
Three versions ofthe following basic model are considered. Money demand depends
on expected inflation, and the government raises revenue to fund a fixed real deficit via the
inflation tax. The idea is to analyze monetary policy taking explicit account of the
17government budget constraint. Fiscal policy is held constant—the real deficit is
exogenous, fixed, and nonnegative. Particular emphasis will be placed on the
characterization of the stationary inflation paths that may be observed in this type of
model. In addition, when multiple economies are considered with different fiscal policies
(different values for the fixed real deficit), an interesting question is whether higher deficits
are associated with higher stationary inflation rates.
One version of this model was presented by Friedman (1971) using a continuous
time framework. Money demand is givenby
(2a) H(t)/P(t) =f(ir(t))
where f(.) < 0, ir(t) is expected inflation, H(t) is money, and P(t) is the price level.
Friedman (1971) assumed perfect foresight by setting ir(t) = P/P, a dot indicating a time
derivative. The fixed real deficit ~i sgiven by
(2b) = k(t)/P(t).
Friedman was interested in finding an equilibrium stationary inflation rate in this
model. By differentiating equation (2a) with respect to time and setting ~r= 0, equation
(2b) implies ~ = irf(ir). The first derivative of the real deficit with respect to inflation,
the “revenue maximizing rate of inflation,” satisfies ir d ~ = —1. Friedman (1971)
noted, based on empirical work, that many countries seemed to experience inflation rates
much greater than their revenue maximizing rates.
Friedman (1971) imposed substantial linearity on the model before concluding that
the equilibrium was a unique steady state. Explicit microfoundations were lacking, and
stability properties ofthe equilibrium were not analyzed. However, the model described by
(2ab) was shown in subsequent research to be closely related to models of money based on
the overlapping generations framework, where explicit microfoundations were available and
dynamic analysis is possible. Also, later authors dropped the assumption that the fiscal
authority maximizes revenue, which, while it may be a reasonable assumption to make,
18removes the possibility of comparing otherwise identical economies with different real
deficits.
A two—period overlapping generations framework that produces discrete time
versions of equations (2ab) was studied by Sargent and Wallace (1981,1987). Each
generation t consists of many agents n = 1 ... N, each with perfect foresight. There are
no bequests, and there is no storage or population growth. The agents born at time t are
endowed with w~(t),w~(t+1), taxed at r~(t),r~(t+1), and consume c’(t), c’(t-i-l).
They maximize a utility function U~[c~(t), c~’(t-4-1)] with standard properties, where each
period’s consumption is a normal good. First period saving, defined as w~(t) — r~(t) —
c~(t),is a function of the rate of return to saving, denoted f[R(t)], where 11(t) is the
gross rate ofinterest. Sargent and Wallace (1981,1987) assume f’(.) > 0.
The government consumes G(t), issues currency H(t), and must meet a budget
constraint which equates government spending with seignorage revenue plus tax revenue.
Arbitrage requires that the return to saving equals the return to holding currency, R(t) =
P(t)/P(t+1). The real value of the government deficit, government purchases less tax
revenue, is assumed to be constant and is denoted by ~. These assumptions imply a
version of Friedman’s model as
(3a) H(t)/P(t) =f[P(t)/P(t+1)]
‘ b’ — H(t) — H(t—1) P(t)
This system can be written as a simple difference equation in real balances h(t) =
11(t)/P(t),
(4) h(t)=e+~(h(t—1)) -
for t 2, given h(1) = ~, where ~&‘ (), ~b’ (..) > 0 based on the assumption that f’(.)
> 0. When the deficit is positive but less than some maximum amount, ~ , this
rnaz
difference equation has two stationary points, one where inflation is high and another
where inflation is low. ff = there is a unique stationary rate of inflation; this is
19the “revenue maximizing rate” that Friedman found. No equilibrium exists when ~ >
The analysis of versions of this model by Sargent and Wallace (1981,1987) can be
interpreted as taking fuller account of the inherent nonlinearity in this framework. By
explicitly specifying the microfoundations of a general equilibrium model, the policy
interpretation was altered. In particular, when there are two stationary states, the one
where inflation is high is an attractor for almost all feasible initial conditions, even though
the low inflation steady state finances the fixed real deficit equally well. Sargent and
Wallace (1987) interpreted this result as suggestive of a theory of hyperinflation. The
Friedman (1971) case where the stationary rate of inflation is unique corresponds to a
unique but unstable steady state in the Sargent and Wallace (1981,1987) analysis.
Comparison of economies with different values of the fixed real deficit ~ indicates that
higher deficits are associated with higher stationary inflation rates if the economy is at the
low inflation steady state, but that higher deficits are associated with lower inflation if the
economy is at the high inflation steady state.
The work of Grandmont (1985), previously discussed, can be interpreted as taking
still fuller account of the inherent nonlinearity in this model. The results of Sargent and
Wallace (1981,1987) are based on a (perhaps quite reasonable) assumption that the
aggregate savings function depends positively on the rate of interest, that is, f (.) > 0.
This amounts to an auxiliary~ assumption that c~(t) and c’(t+l) are gross substitutes.
The standard assumptions on utility assumed above are not sufficient for the gross
substitutes hypothesis to hold. Grandmont (1985) noted that f(.) is an aggregate excess
demand function and that, in general, it could be any continuous function and still satisfy
the assumptions on the utility function.’4 The difference equation given by equation (4)
t4See Sonnenschein (1973).
20could therefore be any continuous mapping and still describe an economy with optimizing
individuals possessing perfect foresight. In particular, Grandmont (1985) isolated some
conditions under which the mapping would be sufficiently nonlinear to generate cyclic and
chaotic equilibrium paths. Furthermore, as has been noted, these equilibria are Pareto
optimal.
When the full implications of nonlinearity are taken into account, the relatively
sharp policy conclusions of earlier analyses of this model tend to be clouded. Since
equation (4) can embody any continuous mapping, the stationary inflation rates and the
dynamic behavior of the system remain in doubt. Based on economic theory alone, few
policy inferences are available. In particular, it is no longer clear what the revenue
maximizing rate of inflation would be, which if any steady state is likely to be attained,
what the effects of higher values ofthe deficit would be, or whether the system is likely to
display complicated dynamics.
V. STOCHASTIC CONSIDERATIONS
The arguments presented so far are based exclusively on deterministic models,
whereas the trend in economics for some time has been to consider stochastic models. One
simple criticism of the stabilization policy results surveyed so far might be that the results
are peculiar to simple deterministic models. In this section, two methods introducing
stochastic elements in nonlinear dynamic models will be considered.
The first method is direct, where the stochastic element of the model is viewed
perhaps as measurement error, and is added to an otherwise deterministic nonlinear
dynamic model. Crutchfield, Farmer, and Huberman (1982) consider the consequences of
introducing noise directly in a particular deterministic equation known to display a
period—doubling bifurcation process culminating in chaotic trajectories. They analyze both
the case where the bifurcation parameter is a random variable and where a white noise
21 -term is simply added to the entire equation. They -show that the two stochastic systems
display an equivalence. More importantly, they show that the addition of noise does not
alter qualitatively the period-doubling bifurcation process or the chaotic dynamics.
Furthermore, the distribution of the stochastic term is not of qualitative importance. In
fact, there is a sense in which chaos is “more likely” when the system is stochastic.’5 These
results, though far from definitive, seem to suggest that the deterministic cycles themselves
are likely to survive the introduction of noise via direct methods. It appears that the
endogenous fluctuations come not from the determinism, but fromthe nonlinearity.
The second method of adding stochastic elements places more emphasis on an
integral role for the uncertainty in the model. In recent years, a great deal of work has
been done on a class of models which are otherwise deterministic but where agents’
expectations are assumed to be conditioned on a-frivolous variable which follows a random
process. Guesnerie and Woodford (1991, p. 28) characterize these models, often called
models of sunspot equilibria or extrinsic uncertainty, as ones where expectations remain
rational but are “garbled by ‘extraneous’ noise.” These models are closely related to the
nonlinear deterministic models that were reviewed earlier in the paper in the sense that
deterministic cycles and chaos can be viewed as degenerate cases of sunspot equilibria,
where the sunspot variable follows a particular deterministic process. Normally, however,
sunspot processes are modeled as being stochastic. Similarities are also apparent in that
the conditions for the existence of deterministic cycles to exist are closely related to the
conditions for the existence of sunspot equilibria. For instance, the conditions for sunspot
equilibria to exist in the overlapping generations model reviewed earlier are the same as the
conditions for deterministic cycles to exist.
One of the first questions asked of models with extrinsic uncertainty was whether
t5See also the discussion in Kelsey (1988).
22there a sense in which the extraneous noise can play an important role. A result on this
question was developed by Cass and Shell (1983). Roughly, their key theorem states that
in an Arrow—Debreu economy with extrinsic uncertainty, the existence of a full set of
claims contingent on sunspot realizations is sufficient to imply that any sunspot
equilibrium is a standard competitive equilibrium, and that therefore the fundamental
welfare theorems apply. In other words, the sunspots do not matter if full insurance is
available. While this result is of some importance, one should perhaps be careful to note
its limited applicability, as stressed by Guesnerie and Woodford (1991). First, full
insurability itself might be viewed as a dubious hypothesis. Second, and more broadly, the
theorem as stated does not necessarily hold for the infinite horizon economies discussed
earlier, and it does not hold for similar economies with, say, incomplete markets,
monopolistic competition, distortionary taxation, or other deviations from standard
assumptions. One might therefore conclude that sunspot equilibria are more likely than
not to be Pareto inferior. As in the models discussed earlier in the survey, however, such a
conclusion relies on rather traditional arguments, again probably quite reasonable, which
justify the stabilization policy, instead of on the introduction of extrinsic noise per se.’6
The parallel with the conclusions concerning the deterministic models also holds with
regard to the efficacy of policy, as in cases where sunspot equilibria are Pareto inferior,
there is little doubt that it is at least possible to design policy rules to eliminate the
fluctuations. 17
Of course, the stochastic elements may enter a nonlinear dynamic model in a more
conventional way, perhaps through preferences or technology, instead of through agents’
beliefs. In such cases, the model is one that incorporates more familiar intrinsic noise.
t6Woodford (1990, p. 46) argues, “The most plausible conditions under which ... sunspot
equilibria ... can occur would seem to be conditions under which such equilibria are possible only because
of market imperfections. As a result, endogenous fluctuations ... will indicate [inefficiency] ....“
t7See Guesnerie and Woodford (1991) for a discussion.
23Less research concerning complicated dynamics in models of this type has been completed
to date, partly because a continuity argument has sometimes been employed to argue that
the results concerning endogenous fluctuations from models with extrinsic uncertainty
carry over to models with a “small” amount of intrinsic uncertainty.’8 Therefore, models
with both intrinsic and extrinsic uncertainty are sometimes viewed as more convoluted
versions of models with only extrinsic uncertainty, and therefore theorists prefer to work
with the extreme case of no intrinsic uncertainty. Since models with sunspot equilibria can
also represent the complicated dynamics of a deterministic model when the sunspot
variable is assumed to follow a deterministic process, a similar argument applies for the
case of no extrinsic uncertainty but a small amount of intrinsic uncertainty. Generally,
however, the question of the relationship between models with either or both types of
uncertainty and the deterministic models remains a topic of current research.
VI. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Many of the examples of economies with chaotic dynamics surveyed earlier in the
paper suggest the conclusion that any dynamics are possible, even when restricting
attention to models based on utility maximization and continuous market clearing.
However, all the theorizing might be viewed as empty ifthere are no observed instances of
chaotic dynamics in measurable economic variables. Therefore, some researchers have
focused on testing for the presence of nonlinear dependence in general and chaos in
particular in macroeconomic and financial time series.’9 Whether or not chaos has actually
been observed is a key source of contention in the literature, but one that is unfortunately
beyond the scope of this paper, and only a few comments can be offered.
‘8See, for instance, Woodford (1986).
19For a discussion of the tests mentioned here, see, for example, Brock and Malliaris (1989) or
LeBaron (1991).
24Trying to determine if a variable has followed a chaotic path is problematic. One
difficulty is that present tests are designed for deterministic data from controlled
experiments, and measurement error in the data can invalidate the procedure or lead to
misleading results. In addition to highly accurate data, these tests require very large
samples; a sample size of 1500 would be considered “small.”
The most common approach tests for the correlation dimension or the Liapunov
exponent. One significant problem with estimating the correlation dimension is that,
particularly with small samples, distinguishing between chaos, nonlinear stochastic
processes and autocorrelated processes is nearly impossible with current techniques.2° In
addition, the statistical properties ofthese tests are not well understood. As a result, most
authors claim to find evidence “suggestive” of chaos, and any claims of clear evidence,
either affirmative or negative, should probably be viewed with the skepticism normally
accorded an open issue.2’
The study of nonlinear dynamic models and deterministic chaos offers several
lessons to econometricians. If forecasting is a goal of economic modeling, the possible
existence of significant nonlinearity in the data suggests standard linear models may
provide misleading results. In the case of chaos, the precision of a forecast when there is
only a very small error in the initial conditions worsens exponentially over time.
Nevertheless, strange attractors often have well—defined overall structure that might
possibly be exploited by economists in some situations. Generally, it seems clear that more
work needs to be done in understanding nonlinear estimation so that econometric models
20This issue was raised by Ramsey, Sayers, and Rothman (1991). Barnett and ilinich (1991)
pointed out some problems with the methodology used in that paper. Unfortunately, as Barnett and
Hinich readily admit, their methodology, while perhaps more consistent with conventional statistical
methodology, also cannot distinguish between chaos and other types of complicated dynamics. A
promising new approach, however, has been developed by McCaffrey, el aL, (1991). In their work, the
problems of measurement error are accomodated and the sample size requirements are considerably
reduced.
2tEvidence consistent with chaos is presented by, for example, Barnett and Chen (1988).
25can describe a greater variety ofbehavior and be more precise as well.
In addition, this research suggests that economists might want to try nonlinear
specifications ofeconomic relationships before resorting to statistical modeling. Ofcourse,
the nonlinearity must be significant enough—nonmonotonic in the univariate case—to
generate complicated dynamics. The hope is that the study of such systems in turn will
help to improve the quality ofeconomicforecasts in the presence ofnonlinear relationships.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Present linear modeling techniques face a critique from economists working on
nonlinear dynamic models. While it is perhaps unrealistic to try to infer the results of a
line of inquiry still in an early stage, this survey has attempted to offer the uninitiated a
feel for the potential of this research agenda to offer alternative policy advice. One
justification for this approach is that potential policy implications seem to be a driving
force behind this research.
For some authors, nonlinear models provide a rigorous concept for the notion of an
inherently unstable economy. However, as a review of the literature has shown, most of
the recent work begins with optimizing models, and the resulting endogenous fluctuations
tend to be equilibrium phenomena, in which markets clear and expectations are correct.
Therefore, this line of work is changing the way economists think about equilibrium, and
the definition of economic versus mathematical equilibrium is an important theme of this
survey. While endogenous fluctuations are clearly shown to be a possibility in the
examples cited, they tend to be Pareto optimal outcomes. It is not clear that nonlinear
dynamic methodologies imply, per se, any new justification for stabilization policy.
Instead, the rationale for policy intervention tends to rely on the same types of arguments
that have been used to justify policy in other economic literature. This conclusion seems
also to hold for models with extrinsic uncertainty. In short, the work on nonlinear
26economic dynamics has so far not provided any new ammunition for the debate between
those who believein activist policy and those who do not.
However, the deviations from baseline assumptions required to obtain a justification
for policy in these models need not be in any sense extreme or unreasonable. Grandmont
(1985), for example, justified policy intervention to eliminate endogenous fluctuations in
his model by assuming that agents learn over time. Of course, if one is wiffing to depart
from perfect foresight (or from rational expectations in stochastic models), then generally
speaking it is not difficult to find models where stabilization policy is fruitful. On the
other hand, the notion oflearning is that agents use the information in available data to
eliminate systematic forecast errors—learning therefore seems to imply perfect foresight
asymptotically, and there may be some question as to how much of a deviation the learning
concept actually entails. More directly, it is not clear that perfect foresight is even a
feasible assumption when equilibrium dynamics become complicated or chaotic, because
then agents in the model predict perfectly even when observers outside the model see only
white noise. These issues remain open, but learning has been a theme of this survey
because thetreatment of expectations is a concern in these models.
An important consideration for policy is that linear approximations in a nonlinear
worldlead to distorted policy conclusions. In the course of a detailed example, this review
illustrated how policy conclusions can be altered substantially by taking increasing account
ofinherent nonlinearity.
The efficacy of policy in nonlinear models has also been emphasized. In a
deterministic nonlinear framework the stability conditions for equilibria play an important
role and are dependent on the parameter values of the model. If one or more of the
parameters is controlled by the policy authorities, there is often considerable ability to
intervene to eliminate any endogenous fluctuations, should the authorities desire to pursue
an activist approach.
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